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Abstract 
 
We develop a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is 
subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank 
competition results in lower economy-wide risk, higher social welfare, lower bank capital 
ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect 
competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and 
capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has 
studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium, they are empirically relevant, and carry 
significant implications for policy guidance.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The existence of a trade-off between competition and bank risk-taking, and by 
extension, between competition and financial stability, is rooted in a special version of an 
intuitively appealing and powerful argument, the “charter value hypothesis” (CVH).  The 
CVH states that under limited liability and unobservable risk choices, a borrower will choose 
riskier investments when the cost of debt is higher, since she will fully enjoy the upside of its 
return if the investment outcome is favorable, but its losses will be limited in the case of an 
adverse investment outcome. Thus, higher funding costs due to increased competition will 
erode a borrower’s charter value (expected profits), prompting her to take on more risk.  
However, as shown in Berger et al. (2009) and Zigraiova and Havranek (2015), 
theory and empirics about the relation between bank competition and financial stability offer 
contrasting results. A recent work of Akins et al. (2016) find empirically that banks facing 
less competition are more likely to engage in risky activities. Importantly, welfare 
implications and the optimal level of banking capital are not clearly assessed, despite the 
importance of the topic1. We provide a clear and simple model that allows the answer to 
these important research questions. 
The CVH has been implemented by modeling banks as entities raising funds from 
insured depositors and choosing the risk of their investment portfolio. If deposits become 
more expensive due to increased competition for funding, then there is an incentive for banks 
to take on more risk. This implication has been illustrated by Allen and Gale (2000 and 
                                                
1 Freixas and Ma (2015) show that competition affects the level of risk depending on banks’ leverage, where 
they assume the cost of capital higher than the cost of debt. Regarding the welfare dimension, Maudos and de 
Guevara (2007) show empirically that the welfare gains associated with a reduction of market power in the 
banking sector are greater than the loss of bank cost efficiency. 
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2004a) in both static and  simple dynamic settings, and it is the key thrust of work by Keeley 
(1990),  Matutes and Vives (1996), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), Cordella and 
Levi-Yeyati (2002),  Repullo (2004), and many others. Importantly, the CVH is also a key 
ingredient of many models that rationalize the incentives for banks to take on more risk 
under deposit insurance, as well as a basic tenet underlying key bank regulations, such as 
capital requirements.2  
However, when banks compete in both loan and deposit markets, Boyd and De 
Nicolò (2005) showed that the trade-off between competition and financial stability can 
vanish. In their model, firms choose the risk of their investment given the loan rates charged 
by banks, while banks provide loans to firms with insured deposits. Thus, risk is determined 
jointly by firms and banks. An increase in bank competition reduces loan rates charged to 
firms, but increases the cost of funds for banks. As firms’ charter value increases with lower 
loan rates, they choose safer investments, which in turn translates into a safer loan portfolio 
for banks. The charter value of the bank is reduced by the increase in the deposit rates, but 
under an assumption of perfect diversification, the equilibrium outcome is one in which 
banks find it optimal to choose lower loan rates as competition increases. Thus, in this more 
complex setting the CVH is applied to two entities—firms and banks—and their charter 
values are interlinked. Recent extensions of this type of model—introducing different assets 
(Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal, 2006 and 2009),  bank heterogeneity (De Nicolò and 
Loukoianova, 2007), or a different risk structure (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010 and 
Freixas and Ma, 2015)—have all essentially aimed at establishing under what conditions the 
trade-off between competition and financial stability predicted by the CVH holds.   
                                                
2 For detailed surveys of these literatures, see Gorton and Winton (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008). 
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As pointed out by Allen and Gale (2004a), however, the trade-off between 
competition and financial stability identified by a large portion of the literature is based on 
partial equilibrium modeling. In their general equilibrium formulation of a Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983)-type economy, Allen and Gale (2004b) demonstrate that perfect competition 
among intermediaries is Pareto optimal under complete markets, and constrained Pareto 
optimal under incomplete markets, with financial ”instability” as a necessary condition of 
optimality. Analogous results are obtained under low inflation in the general equilibrium 
monetary economy with aggregate liquidity risk analyzed by Boyd, De Nicolò and Smith 
(2004).3  Although these general equilibrium results utterly contrasts with the conventional 
wisdom based on many partial equilibrium formulations of the CVH, a direct comparison 
between these formulations is not entirely appropriate, as these general equilibrium models 
do not feature the type of moral hazard in investment associated with financing choices on 
which the CVH is based.   
In this paper we assess the general equilibrium implications of the CVH for 
competition, financial stability and welfare in two versions of a simple general equilibrium 
model in which the choice of the risky investment is unobservable by investors: this is 
precisely the type of information asymmetry generating the moral hazard problem 
highlighted in partial equilibrium formulations of the CVH.  Our analysis is not only of 
theoretical interest, as the CVH has had, and still has a great influence in informing financial 
policy  
                                                
3 Boyd, Chang and Smith (2002) also show that some of the standard implications of partial equilibrium 
modeling concerning the risk effects of deposit insurance may not necessarily hold in general equilibrium. 
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In our set-up, agents specialize in production at the start date, choosing to become 
either firm-entrepreneurs, or bank-entrepreneurs, or depositors, and at a later date they make 
their investment and financing decisions. We establish a mapping between bank market 
power rents and investment and consumption allocations independently of  any specific 
assumption on the mechanism generating a given level of bank market power rents following 
three steps. Specifically, we first identify equilibriums with intermediation parameterized by 
a given interest rate on debt contracts. Second, we characterize first best and constrained 
optimality, and define a perfectly competitive equilibrium as the interest rate that supports a 
core allocation. Lastly, bank market power rents are defined as the deviation of an 
equilibrium interest rate from the interest rate prevailing at a core (perfectly competitive) 
allocation.  
We consider two versions of the model. The first version has banks as coalitions of 
entrepreneurs that are financed by depositors. In the second version, the first model is 
extended to include firms financed by banks funded with deposits. In both models, we show 
that lower banks’ market power rents result in lower economy-wide risk, lower capital ratios, 
more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition, in 
the form of the absence of banks’ market power rents, supports a (second) best allocations 
and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization.  Thus, a general equilibrium economy with 
investment choices subject to moral hazard delivers implications identical to those obtained 
by Allen and Gale (2004b) and Boyd, De Nicolò and Smith (2004) in economies lacking 
these features.  
It is remarkable that in general equilibrium the implications of the CVH for bank risk 
and bank capitalization turn out to be exactly opposite to what a partial equilibrium set-up 
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would imply. This is because the partial equilibrium interpretation of the CVH remains a 
good description of incentives, but it is not necessarily a good predictor of actual outcomes.   
The key reasons why the CVH produces different outcomes in partial as opposed to 
general equilibrium are as follows. In partial equilibrium, the CVH is based on treating the 
amount of available funding for a bank or a firm as either given, or represented by supply and 
demand functions that are determined independently.  Likewise, agents’ choices of whether 
specializing in production, intermediation or becoming depositors are typically either treated 
as exogenous or assumed to be independent.  Therefore, an increase in the cost of funding 
prompts either banks, or firms financed by banks, to choose riskier investment for any given 
amount of funding they obtain. By contrast, in general equilibrium agents’ specialization 
choices as well as their funding decisions are not independent. Thus, an increase in the cost 
of funding will also increase the amount of funding available for investment. In our set-up, 
such an increase will offset the negative impact of higher funding costs on borrowers’ charter 
values. Thus, the equilibrium outcome of an increase in the cost of funding results in 
borrowers choosing a lower rather than a higher level of risk.  
Importantly, an increasing number of studies support the empirical relevance of our 
theoretical results. Recent detailed studies on the effects of a variety of barriers of entry 
impeding competition, as well as of capture of borrowers, supports the implications of our 
model. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that branch deregulation resulted in a 
sharp decrease in loan losses. Restrictions on banks’ entry and activity have been found to be 
negatively associated with some measures of bank stability by Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2004) and Beck (2006a and 2006b). Furthermore, work that links bank competition to 
economic growth is supportive of the positive role of bank competition on growth. For 
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example, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find that banks with 
market power erect an important financial barrier to entry to the detriment of the 
entrepreneurial sector of the economy, leading to long-term declines in a country’s growth 
prospect. Lastly, De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2009),  Boyd, De Nicoló and Jalal (2006, 
2009), Boyd, De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2009), and De Nicolò and Turk Ariss (2009),   
find that a variety of measures of bank risk, as well as bank systemic risk,  indicate a positive 
association between financial stability and stronger bank competition. 
The remainder of the paper is composed of five sections.  Section II describes the 
basic version of the model with banks and depositors only.  Section III  proves existence of 
equilibriums under moral hazard and, for comparison, a no-moral hazard version for given 
interest rates on debt contracts, illustrating the relevant comparative statics. Section IV 
characterizes optimality, defines bank market power rents, and establishes the inverse 
relationship between bank market power rents and optimality. Section V consider the 
extended version of the model with firms, banks and depositors, and demonstrates that all 
results obtained in the basic version of the model continue to hold in the extended model. 
Section VI concludes. Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix. 
 
II.   THE BASIC MODEL 
A.   Time, Endowments and Preferences 
There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2, and a continuum of agents on[0,1]  indexed by 
[0,1]q∈ . A type-q  agent has an endowment of qW  units of date 0 good and labor l . Total 
date 0 goods in the economy are thereforeW qdq =W
20
1
∫ , withW >1.  
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The type of an agent is the agent’s private information. We assume it cannot be 
observed by any other agent, or communicated credibly to any other agent at any feasible 
resource cost. In practice, this assumption of unobservability of types is similar to the 
unobservability of projects’ types in the model by Boyd and Prescott (1986). As in that 
model, it rules out the possibility that contracting among agents at the initial date is made 
conditional on their endowments.  
All agents have preferences over date 2 consumption only, are risk neutral, and derive 
disutility from work. Accordingly, preferences are represented by U (c)−V (l) , where 
U (c) = c  and V (l) = α
2
l2 .  
B.   Technologies   
All agents have a costly access to an “entrepreneurial” technology that requires 
investment of all their date 0 good endowment, and allows them to undertake a risky project 
at date 1.  If an agent chooses to operate a risky project, then he/she becomes an 
entrepreneur.  Otherwise, an agent becomes an investor and her endowment of date 0 good is 
carried over to date 1.  
Agents differ with respect to the resource cost incurred in becoming entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, the “entrepreneurial” technology allows an agent q∈ [0,1]  to choose and 
operate a risky technology at date 1 by transforming all his date 0 good endowment into an 
amount k ∈ (0,W )  of date 1 goods.   Thus, the resource cost for agent q to become an 
entrepreneur isqW , and the opportunity cost of becoming entrepreneurs increases with 
agents’ endowments of date 0 good. Equivalently, agents with a smaller endowment have a 
more “productive” entrepreneurial technology.  
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We interpret the level of k  as the capital available to a bank-entrepreneur. As we 
show below, aggregate capital will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. This feature 
of our model is novel relative to the set-ups by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Boot and 
Thakor (1997), where the aggregate levels of internal funding by either firms or 
intermediaries are exogenously given. 
Becoming an entrepreneur entails access to a set of risky projects with constant 
returns to scale. Projects are indexed by their probability of success p ∈ [0,1] . A p-project 
yields X per unit invested with probability p, and 0 otherwise. 
In the basic version of the model, project outcomes are assumed to be perfectly 
correlated. As noted in Allen and Gale (2000), this assumption is equivalent to assuming that 
the risk of each investment can be decomposed into a common and an idiosyncratic 
component, and that the idiosyncratic component can be diversified away with a large 
number of investments.  
Choosing p  requires labor, according to the linear technology p = l .  Thus, an 
entrepreneur will incur a disutility V ( p) = α
2
p2  in choosing a p-project.  
As noted, as an alternative to becoming an entrepreneur, an agent can become an 
investor, who lends his/her endowment at date 1 to a set of entrepreneurs, as detailed below. 
 
C.   Contracts and information 
Once agents have decided whether to become entrepreneurs or investors, they pool 
resources to finance investment at date 1. We call these coalitions of entrepreneurs and 
investors “banks”. Since the production technology is constant return to scale, the size 
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distribution of banks is indeterminate4. For this reason, it is noteworthy that any result we 
obtain below is independent of market structure.  
 
We assume that investors, called depositors, finance banks with simple debt contracts. 
These contracts pay a fixed amount Rˆ  per unit invested if the investment outcome is 
successful, and 0 otherwise.  
We do not place any specific restrictions on agents’ interactions, assuming just that  
banks and depositors will bargain over Rˆ  at date 1. A lower Rˆ  will be viewed as associated 
with a stronger bargaining power of banks vis a vis depositors. Thus, as made precise below, 
we associate a lower level of Rˆ  with a higher level of rent extraction by banks, and treat Rˆ  
as an exogenous parameter indexing the level of bank market power rents.  
We should stress that our focus is on the effects of banks’ market power rents on risk 
and real allocations. Thus, we refrain to model any specific bargaining game generating 
certain levels of rents. For our purposes, the existence of rents suffices, whatever is the 
mechanism that generates them.  
We consider equilibrium outcomes under two information structures. In the moral 
hazard case, we assume that the choice of p is privately observed by banks, so that there is 
moral hazard. Thus, banks and depositors will bargain over a given value of Rˆ = R , 
independent of the (unobservable) choice of risk p . In the no-moral hazard case the choice 
of p is publicly observed by both banks and depositors, so that there is no moral hazard. 
                                                
4 See Krasa and Villamil (1992) for a model of a bank with imperfect diversification and an optimal bank 
size. 
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Therefore, banks and depositors will bargain over a given value of Rˆ = R
p
, which does 
depend on the (observable) choice of risk p .  
The sequence of events in this economy is summarized as follows. At date 0, agents 
decide to become banks or depositors. At date 1, banks and depositors bargain on R , and 
once an agreement is reached, bankers choose p and investment occurs. At date 2, the output 
is realized, and consumption follows.  
 
III.   EQUILIBRIUM WITH BANKS AND DEPOSITORS 
In this section we establish existence of unique equilibriums for given values of Rˆ , 
and characterize the comparative statics of the model with respect to changes in Rˆ  under 
moral hazard, and for comparison, under no-moral hazard as well. 
 
A.   Moral Hazard 
Let I denote depositors’ total supply of funds. Given I , at date 1 any coalition of 
bank-entrepreneurs of positive measure λ > 0  will choose p to maximize 
  p[(X − R)I + Xk]−α p
2
2
"
#
$
%
&
'λ         (1). 
We focus on interior solutions, denoted with *.  The optimal choice of p satisfies  
 
                                                            p* = (X − R)I + Xk
α
    (2).  
 
 In partial equilibrium, problem (1) represents a simple formulation of the incentives 
induced by the CVH. Its solution (2) represents the relevant outcome. Given I , an increase in 
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R  will decrease banks’ profits in the good state, prompting them to increase risk by choosing 
a lower p . However, in general equilibrium depositors’ supply of funds I  is not given, but 
determined endogenously. If I  increases with R , and this increase offsets the decline in 
bank profits due to an increase in R , then in equilibrium p will increase. The general 
equilibrium outcome of the CVH may turn out to be exactly of the opposite sign of its partial 
equilibrium counterpart. Indeed, we demonstrate this to be the case next.   
 
The profits per bank-entrepreneur in a coalition are: 
  Π(I ) ≡ p*[(X − R)I + Xk]−α p
*2
2
=
[(X − R)I + Xk]2
2α
        (3). 
Therefore, at date 0 an agent [0,1]q∈  will choose to become a bank-entrepreneur if  
 
Π(I ) ≥ p*RqW           (4) 
 
Let qˆ  denote the agent who is indifferent between being a bank-entrepreneur or an 
investor. Then, 
Π(I ) = p*RqˆW      (5) 
 
Clearly, all agents with q∈ [0, qˆ]  will become bank-entrepreneurs, while those with 
q∈ (qˆ,1]will become depositors. Therefore, the fractions of bank-entrepreneurs and 
depositors are qˆ  and 1− qˆ  respectively. 
Note that for any bank to attract external funding, R∈ (0,X ] . Of course, no agent 
would become a depositor if R = 0 , while no bank would raise any funding from depositors 
if R > X .  
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Absent intermediation, in this economy all agents would become entrepreneurs and 
invest their funds in risky projects, but this autarkic arrangement would be clearly highly 
inefficient.  Thus, intermediation can be viewed as essential in a weak sense: as 
intermediation arrangements improve on agents’ welfare under autarky, then they will likely 
be set up. However, other decentralized arrangements, such as credit markets, might attain 
the same allocations, and could be adopted as well, exclusively or in combination.  
We focus on equilibriums with intermediation, defined as follows: 
Definition.  An equilibrium with intermediation is a triplet (I *, p*, qˆ*)  and a value 
R∈{Rˆ∈ (0,X ] : I * ≥ 0, p* ∈ (0,1),q* ∈ (0,1)}  such that:   
p* = (X − R)I
* + Xk
α
    (6) 
Π(I *) = p*Rqˆ*W   (7) 
 I * =W qdq
qˆ*
1
∫ =W (1− qˆ
*2 )
2
   (8) 
Thus, an equilibrium triplet (I , p,q) satisfies the following conditions: 
p = (X − R)I + Xk
α
            (6) 
[(X − R)I + Xk]
2
= RqW     (9) 
I =W (1− q
2 )
2
                  (10) 
 
The existence of equilibriums with intermediation is proved in the following  
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Proposition 1.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an 
equilibrium with intermediation exists and it is unique for every R∈ ( Xk
2W
,X ] .  
 
Denote with Yz ≡
dY
dz
 the change in the endogenous variable Y with respect to 
parameter z . In this economy, the endogenous aggregate bank capital ratio is given by 
K = qk
I + qk
.  
 The comparative statics of the equilibrium triplet * * *ˆ( , , )I p q  and K *with respect to 
R , as well as that of p*  with respect to k , is summarized in the following. 
 
Proposition 2.    In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              IR
* > 0 , qˆR
* < 0 , pR
* > 0 , KR
* < 0  and pk
* > 0 . 
 
 Proposition 2 illustrates how the general equilibrium outcome of the CVH turns out to 
be opposite to its partial equilibrium counterpart. As R  increases, bank profits decline, 
ceteris paribus. This will induce a larger fraction of agents to become depositors, and 
correspondingly a smaller fraction of agents to become bank-entrepreneurs. As a result, the 
total amount of funds available to banks will increase. Bank profits will on net increase, since 
the increase in I  offsets the decline in profits due to a higher cost of funds R . Therefore, 
banks will choose safer risky projects, corresponding to a higher p .  
Proposition 2 also illustrates the equilibrium relationship between bank capitalization 
and risk. AsR increases, the capital ratio of the banking system declines, but this decline does 
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not necessarily imply that bank risk has increased, since p goes up. Thus, the association 
typically made in partial equilibrium between higher capital ratios and lower bank risk does 
not necessarily hold in general equilibrium. However, ceteris paribus, a larger availability of 
per-bank capital induces banks to take on less risk, since p increases with k .  
 
B.   No Moral Hazard 
It is useful to compare the foregoing results with the outcomes of an economy where 
there is no moral hazard. To this end, here we assume that the choice of p is observable. As 
noted previously, the debt contract now pays R
p
 per unit invested, as investors take fully into 
account the observable risk they are exposed to in their specialization and investment 
decisions.  
At date 1, any coalition of bank-entrepreneurs of any positive measure 0λ >  will 
choose p to maximize 
  pX (I + k)− RI −α p
2
2
!
"
#
$
%
&λ         (11). 
The interior solution is:  
 
                                                            p* = X (I + k)
α
    (12) 
 
 Absent moral hazard, by (12) the choice of risk does not depend anymore directly on 
R : therefore, bank’s risk shifting does not occur.  
The profits per bank-entrepreneur in any coalition of positive measure are: 
  Π(I ) ≡ p*X (I + k)− RI −α p
*2
2
=
X 2 (I + k)2
2α
− RI    (13). 
  16  
 
Let qˆ  denote the agent who is indifferent between being a bank-entrepreneur or a 
depositor. Then, 
Π(I ) = RqˆW    (14) 
 
 To sum up, an equilibrium is a triplet ( , , )I p q that satisfies the following conditions: 
p = X (I + k)
α
            (15) 
X 2 (I + k)2
2α
− RI = RqW     (16) 
2(1 )
2
W qI −=                   (17) 
In this case, the existence of equilibriums with intermediation is proved in the 
following  
Proposition 3.   , In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an 
equilibrium with intermediation exists and it is unique for every R∈ ( X
2k 2
2αW
, X
2 (W + 2k)2
4αW
) .  
 
The comparative statics of the equilibrium triplet * * *ˆ( , , )I p q with respect to R  and k  
is summarized in: 
Proposition 4.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , 
*ˆ 0Rq < , 
* 0Rp > , 
* 0RK <  and 
* 0kp > . 
 
It is apparent that the comparative statics with no-moral hazard is identical to that 
with moral hazard. This equivalence suggests that the negative relationship between bank 
risk-taking and the cost of funds R  is robust to the presence or the absence of the CVH. Of 
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course, the levels of depositors’ supply of funds, bank capitalization, bank risk and real 
allocations will be different in the no-moral hazard and moral hazard economies.  
In the next section, we conduct a welfare comparison of the moral hazard and no-
moral hazard economies, and define banks’ market power rents precisely.    
 
IV.   OPTIMALITY AND INTERMEDIARY RENTS 
Under full observability of types and actions, the set of Pareto optimal (first best) 
allocations is defined as the consumption of  the representative entrepreneur, CE , the 
consumption allocations of investors,CI (q) , an investment allocation decision I ,  and a 
threshold value of q  which solve: 
Max  V ≡ q(CE −α
2
p2 )+ CI (q)dq
q
1
∫   (18) 
subject to the resource constraints:           
qCE + CI (q)dq
q
1
∫ = pX (I + k)q    (19) 
I + kq+W qdq =W
20
q
∫           (20) 
Substituting (20) in (19), and (19) in (18),  planning problem (18)  is equivalent to the 
choice of the threshold q  and p to maximize total consumption (equal total output) net of 
entrepreneurs’ disutility of labor: 
V ( p,q) ≡ pX W
2
(1− q2 )+ k
#
$
%
&
'
(q−
α p2
2
q    (21) 
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The objective (21) is strictly concave in both q  and p . Thus, an interior solution to 
(21) is unique and characterized by the following first order conditions with respect to p and 
q : 
X W
2
(1− q2 )+ k
"
#
$
%
&
'q−α pq = 0      (22) 
 
  pX W
2
(1−3q2 )+ k
"
#
$
%
&
'−
α p2
2
= 0    (23) 
 
 
Using (22) and (23) to solve for p and q , one obtains: 
 
 pO = 2X (2k +W )
5α
  and   qO = 2k +W
5W
         (24). 
 
The solution to the planning problem yields the optimal level of risk pO as well as the 
optimal degree of specialization qO among agents.5  We wish to assess whether there exists 
any equilibrium indexed by R  that attains the optimum in both the moral hazard  and no-
moral hazard economies. To this end, let V * =V ( pO ,qO )  denote the value of the welfare 
criterion at the optimum. Note that any level of V  lower than the optimum will result in a 
Pareto-inferior allocation, since by reallocating productive resources (changing either q , p  
or both), more output can be produced to give more consumption to some agent  without 
worsening the utility of anybody else. In other words, in this economy a necessary condition 
                                                
5  The rationale behind changes in the optimal values of risk and specialization to changes in parameters are 
straightforward: The optimal level of risk declines ( pO increases) in both W  and k , as well as in X , and 
increases in the (utility) cost of choosing p -projects, parameterized byα . The optimal fraction of 
entrepreneurs increases in k  and declines in W .  
 
  19  
 
for any consumption allocation to be Pareto optimal is production efficiency net of disutility 
of entrepreneurs’ labor.  
 Let ( pˆ(R), qˆ(R))  denote the unique equilibrium pair associated with a given R . 
Assessing whether an equilibrium can be optimal amounts to verifying whether there exist a 
value of R  such that ( pˆ(R), qˆ(R)) = ( pO ,qO ) .  
Under the maintained assumption that intermediation occurs through debt contracts, it 
is straightforward to show that the Pareto optimal (first best) allocation cannot be achieved in 
the moral hazard economy:   
Proposition 5.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there is no 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the Pareto optimal allocation.   
 
However, a second best allocation is attained by the value of R that maximizes: 
V (R) ≡V ( pˆ(R), qˆ(R))      (25) 
subject to R∈ [ Xk
2W
,X ]            (26). 
Denote with R*  a solution to problem (25) subject to (26). The following proposition shows 
that *R  is an equilibrium in the moral hazard economy, thus supporting the second best 
allocation: 
 
Proposition 6.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, *R  is an 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the second best allocation.   
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Perhaps not surprisingly, absent moral hazard, the first best allocation can be 
achieved, as shown in the following 
 
Proposition 7.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there exist a 
unique R0  such that the corresponding equilibrium with intermediation supports the (first 
best) Pareto optimal allocation.   
 
In sum, we have established that there exist unique equilibriums in both the moral 
hazard and no-moral hazard economies such that  a best allocation is attained.  This 
identification allows us to define perfect competition among intermediaries and their market 
power rents, to which we now turn.   
Recall that we did not place any restriction on the capability of bank-entrepreneurs 
and depositors to bargain over debt contract terms and freely form any type of coalition at the 
initial date. Thus, if coalition formation, setting contract terms, and agents’ specialization 
choice are unfettered, then any bank coalition that offers contract terms that Pareto-improve 
the allocations of its members relative to any proposal of a competing coalition will block the 
formation of such competing coalition.  
Therefore, as in Boyd and Prescott (1986), we identify perfect competition among 
banks with an equilibrium in which bank coalitions offer contract terms supporting 
allocations in the core of this economy. As shown above, this outcome is characterized by 
bank coalitions offering *R  in the moral hazard economy, and 0R  in the no-moral hazard 
economy. 
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A definition of banks’ market power rents follows naturally from the identification of 
the perfectly competitive outcome as one characterized by the absence of market power rents. 
Specifically, market power rents are given by the difference between the perfect competitive 
outcome—indexed by *R  in the moral hazard economy, and  0R  in the no-moral hazard 
economy— and an equilibrium value of R  strictly lower than the corresponding perfectly 
competitive outcome. We denote market power rents by ρ .6 
We have also shown that the objective of the planning problem in both economies is a 
strictly concave function of R . Thus all outcomes with ρ > 0  are Pareto-ranked, in the sense 
that if ρ1 > ρ2 > 0 , the allocations associated with ρ2  Pareto-improves on the allocations 
associated with ρ1 .    
Thus, lower market power rents result in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank 
capitalization, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations, and perfect 
competition supports a best allocation and optimal levels of risk and bank capitalization: this 
is our main result, summarized in the following: 
Proposition 8  In both the moral-hazard and no-moral hazard economies with banks and 
depositors, the equilibrium level of risk pˆ converges to the optimal level of risk *p  from 
below,  to the optimal level of bank capitalization *K from above, and to a best allocation as 
market power rents vanish, i.e. pˆ↑ p* , and  Kˆ ↓K *as ρ→ 0 .     
 
                                                
6 In our context, we do not view the case R > R*  as economically relevant, since the existence of coalitions of 
depositors extracting market power rents from banks is unrealistic. 
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V.   EQUILIBRIUM WITH FIRMS,  INTERMEDIARIES  AND DEPOSITORS  
So far, we have modeled an intermediary as a coalition of entrepreneurs and 
depositors. This intermediary is germane to the bank as a risk taking agent financed by 
depositors modeled by many contributions of the literature.  
In this section we extend our model so as to include firms distinct from banks. We 
show that in this extension, all results obtained previously continue to hold. Moreover, in the 
extended model intermediation has an essential role in allowing the economy not only to reap 
the benefits of efficient specialization in production, but also those associated with 
diversification. Thus, intermediation can be viewed as essential in a strong sense: 
intermediation arrangements improve on agents’ welfare under autarky and other 
decentralized arrangements, such as credit markets, may not  attain the same allocations, as in 
Boyd and Prescott (1986). 
 
A.   The Extended Model 
As before, the “entrepreneurial” technology requires to transform all agents’ 
endowment of date 0 good into an amount (0, )k W∈  of date 1 goods. Differing from the 
previous set-up, however, once an agent [0,1]q∈  has become an entrepreneur, she can either 
choose to operate a risky technology at date 1, becoming a firm, or choose to use an 
“intermediation” technology, becoming a bank. 
A firm has access to a set of risky projects indexed by their probability of 
success [0,1]p∈ . As before, a p-project  yields X  per unit invested  with probability  p, and 
0 otherwise, with the choice of p being privately observed by firms. But again, differing 
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from the basic set-up, we assume that the outcome of the project can be observed only at a 
monitoring cost by outsiders.  
Hence, the intermediation technology allows an entrepreneur—in alternative to 
undertake production directly— to become a monitoring agent by observing the outcome of 
one project and intermediate funds, that is, to become a bank. The resource cost of doing so 
is the entire amount (0, )k W∈  of date 1 goods. For simplicity every firm is thus paired with 
a bank-entrepreneur.  
At date 1, banks raise funds from depositors, promising RD  per unit invested if the 
bank is solvent. At the same time, they offer funds to firms at the rate RL  per unit invested if 
the firm is solvent.  
On the funding side, banks and depositors will bargain over DR . On the lending side, 
LR  will be determined by the choice of entrepreneurs to become either firms or banks. Note 
that depositors are assumed to observe the rate offered by banks to firms at date 1, and will 
observe the relevant payments at date 2.  Thus, depositors observe banks’ actions and their 
relevant outcomes, but not firms’ actions and outcomes directly.  
In this modified set-up, intermediation is essential in two key respects. First, it allows 
firms’ projects to be financed, since it makes it feasible for firms to write debt contracts with 
intermediaries, which in turn can raise finance through the same contracts from depositors. 
Second, under the assumption that project realizations are independent, intermediaries are 
instrumental in allowing the economy to reap the benefits of diversification   
The two polar cases of projects that are perfectly correlated and independent projects 
are described next.  
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B.   Perfectly correlated projects 
We retain the assumption that project outcomes are perfectly correlated. Let I denote 
the depositors’ supply of funds to banks, which in turn lend these funds to firms. Since every 
firm is paired with a monitoring (intermediary) agent, the per-capita amount of internal 
funding of entrepreneurs is k / 2 , since half of entrepreneurs’ resources are spent in 
monitoring.   
Thus, if an entrepreneur is a firm, he chooses p to maximize 
  p[(X − RL )I + Xk
2
]−α p
2
2
        (27). 
The optimal choice of p satisfies  
                                                            p* =
(X − RL )I + Xk
2
α
    (28),  
 
            and its profits are given by   
  ΠE ≡ p*
[(X − RL )I + Xk
2
]
2
        (29). 
If the entrepreneur is a bank, its profits are: 
  ΠB ≡ p*(RL − RD )I         (30). 
 In equilibrium, the level of LR  determines entrepreneurs’ specialization choices. If 
LR  is such that ΠE >ΠB , then all entrepreneurs would prefer to be firms, but they would not 
obtain any financing. Conversely, if LR  is such that ΠE <ΠB , all entrepreneurs would prefer 
to be banks, but there would be no firm they could lend to. Therefore, a necessary condition 
for an equilibrium with both firms and banks to exist is that an entrepreneur is indifferent 
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between being a firm or a bank. This occurs for the equilibrium value of LR  that satisfies 
ΠE =ΠB , which is given by: 
RL = X
3
1+ k
2I
!
"
#
$
%
&+
2
3
RD         (31) 
 
 Equation (31) shows that LR  is a positive function of DR , as a higher cost of funding 
for the bank is partially passed through raising the lending rate charged to firms. On the other 
hand, a larger I  translates into a lower lending rate, which, by Equation (28), induces firms 
to take on less risk ceteris paribus. This is the partial equilibrium CVH effect leading risk to 
decline with the total amount of loans obtained by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005).  
 Finally, substituting (31) in (28) and (29), one obtains expressions for risk and 
entrepreneurs profits given by: 
p* =
2
3
(X − RD )I + Xk5
6
α
          (32) 
ΠE (I ) =
[2
3
(X − RD )I + Xk5
6
]2
2α
       (33). 
 
When we set RD = R , (32) and (33) yield the same type of expressions of  equations 
(8) and (9), which are the equilibrium conditions determining the level of risk and the 
partition of agents between entrepreneurs and depositors for the economy with intermediaries 
and depositors only . Equation (10), the third equilibrium condition in that economy, remains 
unchanged in this extension of the model. Hence, all derivations and propositions applied to 
the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors apply to this moral hazard economy 
with firms, banks and depositors. 
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C.     Independent Projects 
Here we assume that project outcomes are independent. Thus, given a choice of p , 
for any positive measure of firms, p is also the fraction of successful firms, that is, firms 
whose realization of the project outcome is X . In this case, intermediation is necessary in 
allowing the economy to reap the benefits of diversification, for a setting with imperfect 
diversification see Krasa and Villamil (1992). Without banks’ monitoring of the outcomes of 
individual projects, it would not feasible to assess the true fraction of successful projects, and 
thus construct a perfectly diversified loan portfolio.  
Following the same line of arguments used previously, note that if an entrepreneur is 
a firm, he chooses p to maximize 
  pX (I + k
2
)− RLI −α p
2
2
        (34). 
The optimal choice of p satisfies  
                                                            p* =
X (I + k
2
)
α
    (35) , 
            and its profits are :        
ΠE ≡
X 2 (I + k
2
)2
2α
− RLI      (36). 
If an entrepreneur is a bank, then its profits are: 
  ΠB ≡ (RL − RD )I         (37). 
 An entrepreneur is indifferent between being a firm and a bank when the value of LR  
satisfies E BΠ =Π . Such value is given by: 
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RL =
X 2 (I + k
2
)2
4α I
+
1
2
RD         (38) 
 
 Substituting (38) in (36), one obtains:  
ΠE (I ) =
X 2 (I + k
2
)2
4α
−
I
2
RD  (39). 
Similarly to the previous case, when we set DR R= , (35) and (39) yield the same 
type of expressions of  equations (15) and (16), which are the equilibrium conditions 
determining the level of risk and the partition of agents between entrepreneurs and depositors 
for the economy with intermediaries and depositors only and no-moral hazard. Equation (17), 
the third equilibrium condition in that economy, remains unchanged in this extension of the 
model. Hence, all derivations and propositions applied to the no-moral hazard economy with 
banks and depositors apply to this moral hazard economy and independent risks with firms, 
banks and depositors.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
We studied versions of a simple general equilibrium model in which intermediation is 
essential, agents make their investment and financing decisions under moral hazard and the 
CVH applies. We showed that more competition, in the form of lower banks’ market power 
rents, results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capitalization, more efficient 
production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition, defined as the 
absence of market power rents, supports a best allocation, as well as optimal levels of risk 
and bank capitalization in several variations of our model.  
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Thus, a general equilibrium economy which embeds investment choices subject to 
moral hazard of the type modeled by a large partial equilibrium literature, delivers 
implications entirely opposite to what these partial equilibrium constructs would predict. In 
essence, the partial equilibrium implications of the CVH do not necessarily hold in general 
equilibrium. If any inefficiency or financial instability arising from “excessive” competition 
indeed exists, then it should be identified and modeled in a general equilibrium set-up. As 
noted, however, a number of recent empirical studies support our theoretical results. 
Conclusions derived from partial equilibrium modeling that are not robust to general 
equilibrium extensions are likely to result in unwarranted welfare implications. Developing 
general equilibrium set ups in which the nexus between bank capital and risk is defined not 
only relative to individual institutions, but at a system level, appears of great relevance in 
understanding the implications of systemic risk for the design of optimal capital regulations.  
A general equilibrium perspective of bank regulation has been scarcely explored 
theoretically, and has so far been absent in policy discourse. But the current financial crisis 
provides a stark example of the dichotomy between a partial and a general equilibrium view 
of the world and its real consequences. Serious difficulties have arisen in financial 
institutions well adhering to minimum capital requirements designed—in a partial 
equilibrium perspective—to control individual banks’ risk taking incentives. General 
equilibrium modeling of intermediation appear an essential tools to throw light on the 
desirable level of systemic risk in the economy, and how it could be attained. We aim at 
contributing to this research agenda in the future.    
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APPENDIX 
Proposition 1.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an 
equilibrium with intermediation exists and it is unique for every R∈ ( Xk
2W
,X ] .  
Proof:   Rearranging (9) and rewriting (10), we obtain: 
I1(q) ≡ I =
2RWq− Xk
X − R
  (A1);  and 
I2 (q) ≡ I =
W
2
(1− q2 )  (A2). 
An equilibrium is a value of q∈ (0,1)  that satisfies (A1) and (A2).  Observe that  
I2 (0) =
W
2
> −
Xk
X − R
= I1(0) , while I2 (1) = 0 <
2RW − Xk
X − R
= I1(1)  if R ≥
Xk
2W
, which is 
necessary for I1  to be non-negative for every value of  (0,1)q∈ , otherwise no equilibrium 
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would exist.  Let F (q) ≡ I2 (q)− I1(q) =
W
2
(1− q2 )− 2RWq− Xk
X − R
. Clearly, !F (q) < 0  holds. 
Therefore, there exists a unique value of q* ∈ (0,1)  such that  F (q*) = 0 . I *  is found using 
either (A1) or (A2). Using (8), p* =α−1 (X − R)I * + Xk"# $% .  Q.E.D.    
 
 
Proposition 2.    In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , 
*ˆ 0Rq < , 
* 0Rp > , 
* 0RK <  and 
* 0kp > . 
Proof:  Differentiating totally (9) and (10) with respect to I , q , R  and k , we get: 
X − R
2
dI − RWdq = qWdR− X
2
dk          (A3); 
dI + qWdq = 0            (A4). 
The determinant of the system (A3)-(A4) is Δ = X − R
2
qW + RW > 0 .  
Setting dk = 0 , by Cramer’s rule,  
IR =
dI
dR
=
1
Δ
(qW )2 > 0          (A5),     
and  
qR ≡
dq
dR
= −
1
Δ
qW < 0    (A6). 
Substituting (A1) in (8), we get: 
p = 2RWq
α
       (A7) 
Differentiating (A7) with respect to R , we get: 
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pR ≡
dp
dR
=
2Wq
α
+
2RW
α
qR =
2Wq
α
1− RW
Δ
#
$
%
&
'
(> 0      (A8), 
where the second equality was obtained using (A6), and the last inequality derives from  
Δ > RW .   
Finally, by (A5) and (A6) 
KR =
k
(I + qk)2
(qRI − qIR ) < 0       (A9) 
 
Setting dR = 0  and following the same procedure above, we obtain:  
    qk ≡
dq
dk
=
X
2Δ
> 0    (A10). 
Therefore,                                pk ≡
dp
dk
=
2RW
α
qk > 0   (A11) 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3.   , In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an 
equilibrium with intermediation exists and it is unique for every R∈ ( X
2k 2
2αW
, X
2 (W + 2k)2
4αW
) .  
Proof:   Rearranging (16) and (17), we obtain:  
q1(I ) ≡ q =
X 2 (I + k)2
2αRW
−
I
W
      (A9);  and 
q2 (I ) ≡ q = 1−
2I
W
     (A10). 
An equilibrium is a value of I ∈ (0,W
2
]  that satisfies (A1) and (A2).   
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Observe that q1(0) =
X 2k 2
2αRW
, q1(I )  is strictly concave in I  and strictly decreasing for all 
I > Imax , where maxI I>  is the maximum of 1( )q I . Thus, there exists a value Iˆ > Imax  such 
that  q1( Iˆ ) = 0 . On the other hand, q2 (0) =1 , q2 (I )  is strictly decreasing, and q2 (
W
2
) = 0 . 
Thus, a unique intersection of 1( )q I  and q2 (I )—that is, a value of (0, ]2
WI ∈  that satisfies 
(A1) and (A2)—will occur for some (0, ]
2
WI ∈  only if  q2 (0) =1≥
X 2k 2
2αRW
= q1(0)  (A11), and 
q2 (
W
2
) = 0 ≤ X
2 (W + 2k)2
8αRW
−
1
2
= q1(
W
2
)  (A12).  Inequality (A11) implies R ≥ X
2k 2
2αW
, while 
inequality (A12) implies R ≤ X
2 (W + 2k)2
4αW
. Thus, for every R∈ ( X
2k 2
2αW
, X
2 (W + 2k)2
4αW
) , an 
equilibrium exists and it is unique. Using (15), p* =α−1[X (I * + k)]  .                                                                                                  
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , 
*ˆ 0Rq < , 
* 0Rp > , 
* 0RK <  and 
* 0kp > . 
Proof:   Differentiating totally (16) and (17) with respect to I , q , R  and k , we obtain: 
X 2 (I + k)
α
− R
!
"
#
$
%
&dI − RWdq = (qW + I )dR− X
2 (I + k)
α
dk          (A13); 
0dI qWdq+ =            (A14). 
The determinant of the system (A13)-(A14) is Δ = X
2 (I + k)
α
qW + RW (1− q) > 0 .  
Setting 0dk = , by Cramer’s rule,  
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IR =
dI
dR
=
1
Δ
(qW + I )qW > 0          (A15),    and  
qR ≡
dq
dR
= −
1
Δ
(qW + I ) < 0    (A16). 
Differentiating (15) with respect to R , we get: 
pR ≡
dp
dR
=
XI
α
IR > 0      (A18), 
where we have used (A15).  
Finally, by (A15) and (A16) 
KR =
k
(I + qk)2
(qRI − qIR ) < 0       (A9) 
 
Setting 0dR = , and following the same procedure above, we obtain:  
Ik =
dI
dk
= −
1
Δ
qW X
2 (I + k)
α
< 0    (A20),    
 Hence,  
pR ≡
dp
dR
=
X
α
(Ik +1) =
X
α
(1− qWX
2 (I + k)α−1
qWX 2 (I + k)α−1 + RW (1− q)
) > 0 , (A21), 
where we have used (A20) and Δ .                                                                             Q.E.D.  
 
Proposition 5.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there is no 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the Pareto optimal allocation.   
Proof:  Inserting (10) in (8), replacing ( p,q)  with ( pO ,qO )  in  (8) and (9), and solving for R  
in (8) and (9) respectively, we obtain 
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R1 ≡ R = X +
2Xk − 2α pO
W (1− qO2 )
        (A22) 
R2 ≡ R =
XW (1− qO2 )+ 2Xk
W (1− qO2 )+ 4qOW
     (A23) 
Using (24) in (A22) and (A23) yields  R1 = 0 ≠
4XW
4W − 2k + 20W 2k +W
5W
= R2 .  
Thus, there does not exist a value of which yields an equilibrium with ( p,q) = ( pO ,qO ) . 
Thus, there is no equilibrium that supports the Pareto optimal allocation.             Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 6.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, *R  is an 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the second best allocation.   
Proof:  A solution *R to problem (25) subject to (26) exists, since the continuous function 
V (.) in (25) is maximized over the compact set (26). Since function (.)V  is strictly concave 
in ( , )p q , there exist a unique pair ( pˆ*, qˆ*)  that solves (25) subject to (26). Since pˆ(R)  and 
qˆ(R)  are uniquely determined by the equilibrium conditions (8)-(10), there exists a unique 
*R  such that pˆ* = pˆ(R*) and qˆ* = qˆ(R*) .                                                                 Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 7.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there exist a 
unique 0R  such that the corresponding equilibrium with intermediation supports the (first 
best) Pareto optimal allocation.  
Proof:  Using  (17) and ( , )O Op q  in (15) and (16), we obtain: 
 
2α pO = X W (1− qO2 )+ 2k( ) (A24) 
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X 2 W
2
(1− qO2 )+ k
"
#
$
%
&
'
2
−αRW (1− qO2 ) = 2αRqOW (A25) 
Equation (A24) is independent ofR . Solving (A25) for R , we obtain: 
R* =
2k +W (1− qO2 )( )
2
X 2
4αW (1+ 2qO − qO2 )
.   (A26) 
Lastly, we need to verify that *R  is an equilibrium. By proposition 3, this amounts to verify 
that R* ∈ ( X
2k 2
2αW
, X
2 (W + 2k)2
4αW
) . Thus, *R is an equilibrium if  
 X
2k 2
2αW
<
2k +W (1− qO2 )( )
2
X 2
4αW (1+ 2qO − qO2 )
(A27) 
 
and 
 
2k +W (1− qO2 )( )
2
X 2
4αW (1+ 2qO − qO2 )
<
X 2 (W + 2k)2
4αW
(A28). 
Rearranging (A27), we obtain  
4k 2 +W 2 (1− qO2 )2 + 4kW (1− qO2 ) > 2k 2 (1+ 2qO − qO2 ) (A29). 
By assumption, k <1, 1W > and0 ≤ q ≤1 . Therefore, 
2k 2 (1+ 2qO − qO2 ) ≤ 4k 2 andW 2 (1− qO2 )2 + 4kW (1− qO2 ) > 0 . Thus, inequality (A29) holds, 
hence, inequality (A27) is verified. 
 (A28) is equivalent to  
2k +W (1− qO2 ) < (2k +W ) 1+ 2qO − qO2 (A30) 
Since 1≤1+ 2qO − qO2 ≤ 2  and1− qO2 ≤1 , (A30) holds, thus (A28) is verified. Q.E.D.  
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Proposition 8 In both the moral-hazard and no-moral hazard economies with banks and 
depositors, the equilibrium level of risk pˆ converges to the optimal level of risk *p  from 
below,  to the optimal level of bank capitalization *K from above, and to a best allocation as 
market power rents vanish, i.e. *pˆ p↑ , and  *Kˆ K↓ as 0ρ → .   
Proof:  By propositions 2 and 4, pˆ  increases monotonically inR . By propositions 6 and 7, 
there exists a unique optimal *R  that supports the optimal level of risk *p . Therefore 
pˆ(R)↑ pˆ(R*) = p*  and Kˆ (R)↓ Kˆ (R*) = K *asρ = R* − R→ 0 .                                   Q.E.D. 
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